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1  Introduction 
Smartphones feature advanced computing 
ability and connectivity compared to basic 
cell phones. They are notably able to run 
applications that users can install from mo-
bile application markets. To do so, most 
smartphone manufacturers maintain a mo-
bile application market operating much like 
a Debian repository. 
Mobile application markets facilitate the 
distribution of applications and thus help 
developers advertise their work and cus-
tomers find useful applications. In addition, 
the operators of mobile application markets 
can control the quality and the content of 
the applications. These markets are growing 
rapidly with more than 300’000 application 
in the App Store of Apple and more than 
100’000 in the Android Market of Google. 
This is not only a great opportunity for 
phone manufacturers to earn money but 
also for indie developers (single or small 
teams of developers with small financial 
support) who can thus have a great distri-
bution channel. Steve Demeter, the Trim 
game developer for iPhone, became mil-
lionaire with a single puzzle game1. 
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Obviously, as new markets generate a lot of 
money, the temptation of misbehavior to 
steal part of the benefits is big. The first fa-
mous case was the one of Molinker2 who 
self-rated his applications with 5 stars to 
pump up his ranking in order to increase its 
revenue stream. Also, in summer 2010, 
Thuat Nguyen3 used stolen credit cards and 
iTunes accounts to buy his own books: this 
earned him a lot of money but, as he ranked 
42 of his books in the top 50, the operation 
became suspicious to Apple. Finally, the 
Aura Faint application was removed from 
the App Store because it was uploading all 
the contacts of the phone to the develop-
ers’ server: it is unknown how exactly this 
information was to be exploited, but it cer-
tainly could have been very useful for 
spamming. 
In this report, we will consider the problem 
of misbehavior in mobile application mar-
kets. We will investigate multiple attacks by 
misbehaving developers, users or network 
operators that aim at breaking rules for 
their own benefit, managing to outwit the 
operators’ control on which applications 
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can be installed. We notably suggest novel 
attacks that may affect mobile markets in 
the future: in particular, we show that it is 
possible to get revenue for applications cre-
ated by someone else, trick a user to down-
load and buy an application and new ways 
to pump up an application’s ranking. We 
will also discuss possible solutions against 
spyware applications and cheating develop-
ers. 
2 Related Work 
Seriot (1) showed that even though iPhone 
applications were sandboxed and that only 
a few APIs were available in the SDK, a mali-
cious developer could access more infor-
mation than expected. He created a simple 
proof of concept application that could ex-
tract all contacts and many past GPS posi-
tions without the user seeing a warning. He 
concluded that even though the App Store 
validation process is very strict, malware is 
still able to pass through. 
Enck et al. (2) worked on the TaintDroid ap-
plication, which tracks the data flow in an 
Android application, to analyze how private 
data is manipulated by third-party applica-
tions. After analyzing 30 of the top popular 
applications, their results showed that, two-
thirds of them exhibited suspicious handling 
of sensitive data that might have led to pri-
vacy issues. 
Smith (3) shows that the unique ID of 
iPhones is available to developers and high-
lights problematic privacy consequences. 
For example, online services could track 
users using such identifier; he concludes 
that this is an important loss of anonymity 
as services could link pseudonyms with real 
users. 
Girardello and Michahelles suggested an 
alternative application market (4), where 
the ranking would be based on usage and 
location rather than on users’ vote. The ad-
vantage of their solution compared to the 
existing rankings is that it would take into 
account more real-life parameters to en-
hance the user’s experience. 
3 Mobile applications securi-
ty model 
We start by describing the different solu-
tions put in place on smartphones to limit 
misbehavior by third-parties without affect-
ing users’ experience. 
3.1 Mobile application markets 
strategies 
In this chapter, we compare two mobile 
application markets and see the different 
models that they put in place to distribute 
applications. 
The App Store by Apple4 is the most popular 
with more than 300’000 applications avail-
able. The only way for a user to install appli-
cations on his iPhone (unless the iPhone is 
jailbroken) is to download them from the 
App Store. In order to publish an application 
in the App Store, Apple must first certify 
developers: their identity is verified and an 
annual fee must be paid. Then, their appli-
cations must be verified and approved by 
Apple; they check for example the content 
of the application and the data accessed. 
This way, Apple controls which applications 
are installed on the phone and thus pro-
vides a layer of security for end users. 
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Sandboxing is used and will be described 
later.  
The Android Market5 is the default market 
on the Android phones; it is owned by 
Google and has more than 100’000 applica-
tions. The developers are not certified, nor 
are the applications verified before being 
published, but rather removed due to com-
plaints. The restrictions to publish an appli-
cation in the Android market are roughly 
the same as on the App Store (except that 
there is no subjective refusal of an applica-
tion). But since Android is an open platform, 
Android Market does not have the exclusivi-
ty. Anyone can create its own market and 
deploy it on Android phones (although to 
install a new market one should be an ex-
perimented user, as it is not possible to find 
third party markets on the default Android 
Market. One would thus need to find third 
party markets and download them through 
the browser). Therefore, there is absolutely 
no control on applications deployed on an 
Android device and malware might easily be 
installed. 
3.2 Markets on Android 
Since the Android phone enables users to 
install third party application markets, it is 
interesting to look at the differences and 
advantages between them. 
We can see four main differences in the 
markets on Android (it is important not to 
confuse “the Android Market”, which is the 
official market on Android, with the “mar-
ket on Android”, which could be any market 
installed on the platform). 
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The fee to submit an application: to be effi-
cient, a market needs human resources that 
will not only maintain and supervise it but 
that will also verify the content and quality 
of the applications that are submitted. (On 
some platforms, part of the fee is also used 
to generate a certificate for the developer 
that will be used to sign the application with 
the help of a third party such as VeriSign: 
but on Android, the applications can be self-
signed, therefore there is no need to be cer-
tified by a central authority). 
The income cut: owning an application 
market on a mobile platform is like owning 
a goose that laid the golden eggs. Most of 
the mobile application markets take a per-
centage on every transaction, therefore the 
more successful is a market and the more 
paid apps are downloaded, the higher the 
income is. The income cut is generally the 
business opportunity in the application 
market model. 
Application approval: the process of ac-
cepting an application can vary a lot be-
tween different markets, going from human 
and automated testing to 100% acceptance 
without verification. Generally, the approval 
process defines the quality of a market and 
the risk of finding malware. 
Rating, ranking and promotion: this is one 
of the most important criteria for a devel-
oper. The rating is generally done by the 
end users, the ranking is done by the mar-
ket operator with the input of the rating 
and finally the promotion is done by the 
market operator. 
The main portal is Android Market: it is the 
default one owned by Google and prein-
stalled in all Android devices. It now offers 
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more than 100’000 applications. To be able 
to submit an application on this portal, the 
developer must first pay a 25$ fee. Google’s 
additional income is 30% of the sale price. 
Even though Android market accepts a pri-
ori all applications, some might be pro-
cessed to ensure that they follow the guide-
lines and policies (we can find restrictions 
such as nudity, unpredictable network us-
age, harm to the devices or its data). 
MiKandi6 is another interesting market, 
which positions itself as the most open one. 
There is no entry fee, no restriction on the 
quality nor the content of an application 
(therefore we find a lot of nudity related 
applications available) and they are not ver-
ified (nevertheless an application can be 
removed due to complaints). The catches 
with this market are the sales cut of 35% for 
the market operator and the general dis-
trusted reputation of the applications. 
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There are many other portals such as Apps-
Lib7, SlideMe8 and AndroidGear9, whose 
main differences are controls carried out on 
the applications, the portal fee cut and the 
promotion provided to the applications. See 
Figure 1: application markets on Android 
3.2.1 Sandboxing 
The sandboxing is a general IT principle that 
became a standard to cope with third-party 
applications in the smartphone environ-
ment. A sandboxed application is totally 
isolated from the rest of the system and the 
other applications and it can only communi-
cate through predefined APIs that are con-
trolled by the OS. The purpose of this sys-
tem is to ensure that an application cannot 
harm the system and to avoid private in-
formation abuse from the phone or from 
other applications. On Android, applications 
are totally isolated from each other (except 
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Figure 1: application markets on Android 
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if they are written by the same developer 
who could create connections between his 
apps), but there are no limitations on the 
APIs: an application with the correct per-
mission could therefore even brick the 
phone (transform the phone into an unusa-
ble brick). All the resources needed by the 
application are written in a manifest file 
that that will prompt the user with a warn-
ing message during the installation, giving 
to the user the choice of either continuing 
the installation or aborting it(5).  
Android has 115 different permissions10 
that are categorized into a dozen groups to 
make them more understandable for the 
user: for example a category “that costs 
money” contains sending SMS and outgoing 
phone calls. However, this specific structure 
might be a problem in itself as it puts many 
different permissions under the same ban-
ner. This could mislead the users into in-
stalling modifications of the system along 
with the application: for example in the 
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“system tools” category we can find “pre-
vent the phone from sleeping”, which could 
be legitimate for a game, but also “modify 
global system settings”, which should only 
be used by very specific applications. There-
fore, it relies on human ability to under-
stand what data is shared and this is a po-
tential weakness. See Figure 2 
3.2.2 Verification 
The Android market doesn’t verify the 
submitted applications and relies on the 
users to report inappropriate content or 
problematic applications. Nevertheless, 
Android Market reserves the right to verify 
an application before accepting it. 
3.2.3 The Ranking 
The ranking process is obscure and not doc-
umented in order to avoid manipulation. 
However, the following assumptions can be 
done on the different criteria used for the 
ranking:  
 Number of downloads is obviously 
a trivial criterion.  
Figure 2: privilege warning messages 
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 “Install base” corresponds to the 
number of users who have installed 
the application, then excludes the 
users that downloaded the applica-
tion several times or that have un-
installed it.  
 Acceleration: the ranking would al-
so try to promote new applications 
with a lot of potential and with a 
sudden increase in downloads. 
 Velocity: number of constant down-
loads could help to detect applica-
tions that will become trendy and 
that should be well ranked.  
 Users’ feedback might affect the 
ranking or at least influence other 
users’ downloads, which will have 
some bearing on the other criteria 
above. 
Baptiste Benezet form faberNovel ex-
plains the way the App Store from Ap-
ple ranking algorithm works: “The for-
mula is 8 times the sales of the current 
day + 5 times the sales on the 2 pro-
ceeding days + 2 times the sales on ini-
tial date”11. So              
                 
Nevertheless, we can find on the An-
droid forum some complaints about a 
surprising ranking for a Spanish applica-
tion situated in the top paid applica-
tions, that has a rating of 4.2 and less 
than 1000 download for the last 2 
months12. It would be reassuring to 
know that Google does not distort the 
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ranking of the applications and that of-
ficial or independent organizations 
could investigate its search ranking al-
gorithm. 
3.3 Adversary Model  
Before examining the possible types of de-
veloper misbehavior, let’s first consider who 
this developer could be and his motivation. 
In most cases, he will be a malicious devel-
oper driven by a financial incentive. His aim 
will be to earn more money than he is enti-
tled to. He can lure the user into spending 
more than expected by asking him to pay 
for a service when the application is free; he 
can add hidden costs to the application by 
sending out text messages or phone calls to 
highly charged services; he can damage the 
phone and offer an expensive solution to 
repair it; he can use or steal information 
from the phone in order to sell it to statisti-
cal analyzers (used for publicity for exam-
ple) and to spammers; he can blackmail the 
user in exchange of not publishing private 
information on the internet;  finally he can 
lie to the user by changing his review and 
ranking for increasing the number of down-
loads (and payments) of an application that 
is not worth it(6) (7).  
Additionally, there are non-malicious devel-
opers who simply desire to harm the user 
by damaging the phone. Their motivation is 
not financial, but a pursuit of power, fun, 
challenges and testing the system. They 
usually are teenagers who do not fully real-
ize the consequences of their acts. 
Finally, we should not forget the developer 
that has good will but unfortunately his ap-
plication is damaging the user’s phone with 
bugs, by creating security holes or enabling 
privacy leakage, such as opening network 
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ports on the phone or uploading contact 
lists to an unsecured server. 
4 Application life cycle 
We will now have to look at the different 
steps in the lifecycle of an application in 
order to understand how to trick the system 
or successfully install malware on an An-
droid phone. See Figure 3 
1. Development: the developer im-
plements the functionalities and 
decides which resources his appli-
cation will need (such as address 
book, GPS, camera, core system ac-
cess). 
2. Submission: the application is up-
loaded with a description, key-
words and screenshots to the ap-
plication market. This information 
will be used by the end users to 
help them decide if they want to 
download and use the application. 
3. Validation: it does not exist in eve-
ry market, since some markets ac-
cept applications without verifying 
them before, but, when done, it 
can last 2 to 7 days. 
4. Update: where the developer can 
change the functionalities, descrip-
tion and price of his application. 
5. Download: hopefully the applica-
tion is downloaded and the devel-
oper can see its statistics and get 
revenue. 
6. Usage: the user will launch the ap-
plication and use it or let it work in 
the background. 
7. Ranking: finally, after the applica-
tion is used, the user gives a raking 
to the application and adds com-
ments to help other users decide if 
the application is worth it. 
5 Misbehavior 
In this section, we consider potential at-
tacks on each phase of mobile application 
lifetime.  
5.1 Development phase 
As suggested in paper (1), during the devel-
opment phase, the developer would try to 
trick the system by fooling the sandbox or 
by abusing some of the APIs. An application 
in Android is not totally sandboxed; it can 
communicate with other processes or with 
the hardware. To be able to exit from the 
sandbox, the developer specifies in a mani-
fest which resources will be needed by the 
application; then, during the installation, 
the user will have a warning message asking 
approval for the application to use the re-
sources. If a developer is able to access re-
Figure 3 : Life of applications 
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sources without going through the expected 
API and therefore not specifying them in 
the manifest, then he can avoid having the 
warning message displayed on the phone: 
this will fool the system by accessing re-
sources on the phone it is not supposed to.  
5.2 Submission phase 
In the section, we suggest a new type of 
attack.  
One peculiarity of the android platform is 
that we can find many different markets. 
This is a great advantage for developers 
who don’t wish to follow strict rules or who 
want to benefit from different promotion 
and distribution methods. However, since 
there are multiple markets and the devel-
oper self-signs his applications, the strength 
of openness could turn into a weakness: 
someone could download an application 
(from another developer) and impersonate 
it as if he was the author. The steps to do so 
are the following: 
1. Be rooted on the device by either 
installing a custom Rom form, for 
example, XDA-developer13 or by 
Rooting the OS14. 
2. Install a file explorer that allows 
root access such as Astro File Man-
ager15 or equivalent to get access to 
package of the download applica-
tions from Android market. 
3. Find, download and install the ap-
plication chosen to be impersonat-
ed from one market. 
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4. Extract the application from “da-
ta\apps” or “data\pvtapps” reper-
tory on the phone onto the com-
puter. 
5. Create a developer account in the 
other application market for An-
droid. 
6. Publish the application as if it was 
his. 
If it is published for a lower price than the 
one published by the real developer and on 
many markets, it might even be download-
ed more often than the genuine one and 
therefore generate even more money. 
5.3 Validation phase 
The Android Market does not verify nor val-
idate submitted applications. Instead, it re-
lies on user flagging and complaints to 
check if an application might harm the 
phone. Then, depending on complaints, it 
verifies the application and possibly decides 
to remove it. A way to remove a concurrent 
application could be to flag it as inappropri-
ate, then Google might remove it from the 
market during the tests (but the removal 
would be for less than a day so not very ef-
fective). 
5.4 Update phase 
In the section, we suggest a new type of 
attack.  
In this phase we are going to discuss social 
engineering. The aim is to trick existing us-
ers of a good application to update to a new 
version that contains malware. The devel-
oper creates a nice application that will be 
downloaded for its functionalities (whatev-
er they are) then there will be an update 
which will contain the malicious code. There 
will obviously be a warning that will appear 
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to the user during the installation phase; 
but, as the user liked the application (and 
trusts the developer because his first ver-
sion worked well), he will simply discard the 
warning and install the update of the appli-
cation. 
Another possible misbehavior is to trick the 
users into downloading expensive applica-
tions by making the users believe they are 
worth it. In order to achieve this, the devel-
oper should first submit a nice and simple 
application for free. After a while, when it 
will have been downloaded many times, the 
ranking will be good and the reviews posi-
tive. At this point the developer will change 
the description of the application by adding 
many great new features (that don’t exist), 
change the screen shots with the fake func-
tionalities added, and obviously charge an 
expensive price. Existing users will then not 
only want to update and pay, but also new 
users will rely on the great results of the 
first version to decide to buy the applica-
tion. 
5.5 Download phase 
Several attacks described in this paper also 
happen during the download phase, such as 
the Sybil or the impersonation attacks. 
5.6 Using phase 
This is the phase where the malware will 
actually be executed. Since on Android 
there are no private APIs (like on iPhone), if 
the user blindly accept all the permissions 
of an application, the application will have 
full control of the phone and be able to 
harm it. At this point, we could find exactly 
the same malware on an Android phone as 
on a PC, such as key loggers, phishing appli-
cations, spamming etc. (7) (6).  
5.7 Ranking phase 
The ranking position of an application is one 
of the most important criteria of its success. 
An obvious way to misbehave and pump up 
an application ranking is to use a Sybil at-
tack (8) and create many Gmail accounts 
that will be used to fake several users who 
will then all download and rate the same 
application. 
To do so, we have used an HTC HD2 running 
on Windows mobile with an Android virtual 
machine. This way we could totally wipe 
clean the device between “users” and no 
serial number of the device could be sent to 
Android Market. The process of cleaning up 
the device and rebooting the virtual ma-
chine took roughly 15 minutes.  
To create a Gmail account, one needs to 
provide a telephone number that will be 
used to communicate a onetime passcode. 
This complicates the attack since it might 
require many different phone numbers to 
avoid being detected by Google. We there-
fore created instead, during the setup of 
the phone, accounts that only require a 
name, email, password, a secret question 
and a Capcha. Filling up the form and ac-
cepting the terms took approximately 2 
minutes.  
Then we had to find an application with 
very few downloads and no rating to be 
able to influence it as much as possible (it is 
not easy to find this kind of application 
since they usually don’t appear in the top 
40 even when using the search by name 
option). We decided to use the search key-
word “Marge”: out of the 37 results we 
chose the application in the 15th position 
“Large marge from peewees big A” by 
“Metro Videomayors” (this application real-
ly looks like malware and we don’t advise 
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you to use it) that had no ranking, no com-
ments, and less than 24 downloads. 
At every iteration of the Sybil attack, we 
downloaded the application, put 5 stars rat-
ing, added a positive comment and tagged 
all the other comments as useful. This expe-
rience was carried out 26 times and the 
ranking of the application went from 15/37 
to 2/37. 
These are the steps to follow in order to 
affect artificially the ranking: 
1. Install an Android boot loader on a 
Windows Mobile device. 
2. Boot on Android. 
3. Select a language (the same every 
time). 
4. Open the Market application. 
5. Create a new Gmail account with a 
fake name. 
6. Find the application to pump up 
7. Mark all the existing comments as 
“Useful” 
8. Download the application. 
9. Put a 5 star rating with a positive 
comment. 
10. Restart the phone on Windows 
Mobile. 
11. Reinstall the Android boot loader. 
This algorithm could be accelerated by 
an automated script on an Android sim-
ulator, where the only user interaction 
would be to enter the Captcha at the 
creation of an account, and therefore it 
could generate an arbitrary large num-
ber of votes. 
6 Possible Countermeasures 
In this section we will suggest some 
measures that the Android team, the An-
droid Market team and the users could im-
plement to avoid the above attacks. 
6.1 Development phase 
This counter measures are aimed at the An-
droid development team. It is obvious that 
the team is under high pressure to come 
out every few months with a new version of 
the OS and with new functionalities (9). It is 
important that at every release they ensure 
that the access to each resource is exactly 
limited to one and only one privilege; this 
way they could for example avoid giving 
GPS coordinates by reading the metadata 
from the pictures. 
6.2 Submission phase 
This point is very tricky because it would 
necessitate collaboration between different 
market providers that are competitors. This 
collaboration would require some efforts 
and might reduce their income, since they 
would have to refuse illegitimate applica-
tion (though it would protect the develop-
ers). 
There are two possible solutions to this 
problem. The first one would be to ask the 
developer to prove the ownership of the 
source code. This could be done, for exam-
ple, by requiring the developer to submit 
the application twice: once with the appli-
cation that is supposed to be submitted to 
the market, and the second time adding to 
the application a given nonce that would 
appear on the screen. The disadvantages of 
this solution are that it would be time-
consuming for the developer and would 
require the market operator to manually 
verify every application submitted (which is 
not done at the time being). 
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The second possibility would be for the 
market to verify whether a new application 
has already been submitted on another 
market and, should this be the case, if it is 
has been submitted by the same developer. 
Let’s suppose that the Android platform 
could offer a way for all the markets to 
communicate between them. First one 
should be able to verify if an application 
already exists on the market. Using a hash 
cannot suffice since any insignificant modi-
fication to the application (such as changing 
the version number or the developer’s 
name in the metadata with a hex tool) 
would totally change the resulting hash. 
Verifying the signature would also not be 
enough, as the malicious developer could 
simply replace the real developer’s signa-
ture with his own. 
This problem of impersonation is atypical, 
as usually the malicious person tries to pre-
tend that the data he provides originates 
from somebody else, and not that someone 
else’s data is coming from him. 
One advice that we could give to the devel-
oper is to clearly display his identity in the 
application: however, even this doesn’t in-
sure that the developer will receive the 
payment for the purchased application, as 
the billing is done by the market itself and is 
not controlled by the application, but at 
least in case of litigation he would easily be 
able to prove ownership of the application.  
6.3 Validation phase 
The Android Market team should definitive-
ly validate applications put on their market, 
even though on the Apple’s App Store, 
which is doing validation, we can find mal-
ware. 
If one market on Android would wish to 
stand out, its best option would be to in-
state some kind of validation and then 
guarantee less malware on its market. 
6.4 Update phase 
An obvious way to protect the users from 
the misbehavior in the update phase would 
be to instate validation, which the applica-
tion would have to go through at every 
submission or update. 
Another option is to consider every update 
as a new submission and assign the rating of 
an application to its version and not to the 
application itself, but this solution would 
discourage developers to update their ap-
plication. 
Finally, since the attack relies on social en-
gineering, the defense could work on the 
same level, warning the user about the dif-
ferences between the two versions, such as 
differences in the permission, the descrip-
tion and in the rating. 
6.5 Using phase 
Since the malware acts on the phone the 
same way it acts on a computer, it would be 
logical to use the same protective tools on 
both devices. iPhone somewhat works this 
way since it requires privileged during usage 
and not during installation. Even though 
repeated warnings annoy users, it should be 
essential for them to be able to choose for 
every application from the following firewall 
policies: “warn me for every access”, “warn 
me only once” or “I trust this application, 
don’t warn me”. Additionally, data logging 
should be available for the user to be able 
to see the activity done by the application, 
such as the number of SMSs sent, the web-
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sites contacted or the data read from the 
shared memory (such as photo, music etc.). 
Since there are so many application that are 
so easily downloaded, Antivirus that don’t 
only rely on signature (as they currently do) 
(9) should become a standard, and analytic 
sandboxes should be available for testing 
and proofing applications (10). 
6.6 Ranking phase 
As always with the Sybil attack the problem 
is the weak pseudonyms.  A simple way to 
protect the system against this kind of mis-
behavior would be to make the creation of 
a new account more complicated or to use 
strong pseudonyms (8) such as a telephone 
number or the phone’s serial number to 
verify the user’s identity. 
The Android Market should use (and might 
already do) some sort of pattern recogni-
tion that could raise a red flag when an ac-
count is created, only downloads a specific 
application, gives it a great rating and never 
reconnects again. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have seen for every devel-
opment phase the misbehavior that a de-
veloper could do. Some of the attacks, such 
as the sandbox escape, can already be 
found in literature, but other attacks, such 
as the developer impersonation, the multi-
ple download and ranking and the social 
engineering in updates, have been present-
ed here for the first time. 
The same way firewalls became standard in 
computers, data filters and Sandboxes will 
have to become standards in the 
smartphone environment. People want to 
trust the application offered by application 
markets and want to be able to download 
applications even from indie developers, 
without having to fear for malware. 
The certification phase should become a 
standard for market acceptance in order to 
minimalize the risk of finding malware in 
applications. 
For a platform to be successful in the long 
run it is important on the one hand for de-
velopers to trust the market and know that 
their revenue won’t be stolen, and on the 
other hand for the end user to know that it 
can trust the application he installs, that it 
won’t steal his private information nor have 
hidden costs. 
In the future, we intend to verify specifically 
for every market on the Android which one 
of the above mentioned misbehaviors could 
occur and develop; how the markets will 
react to protect the developers and con-
sumers; whether developers will them-
selves require added features from the 
markets in order to be protected and pro-
tect the users, and whether the users’ de-
mands of safe applications will be answered 
by new standards in smartphones; and 
which particular market will eventually be 
the most secure and reliable for the user 
and developer. 
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